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DISCRETE GEOMETRY FOR ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY
MOON DUCHIN AND BRIDGET EILEEN TENNER
Abstract. We discuss the “compactness,” or shape analysis, of electoral districts, focusing
on some of the most popular definitions in the political science literature, which compare
area to perimeter. We identify four problems that are present in these and all contour-based
scores of district geometry. To address these issues, we set the stage for discrete versions of
classical shape scores, laying out definitions, goals, and questions for a promising new fusion
of combinatorics and discrete geometry with electoral geography.
1. Introduction
A variety of elections in the United States—for the House of Representatives, state legisla-
tures, city councils, school boards, and many others—are conducted by partitioning a region
into geographically-delimited districts and selecting one winner per district via a plurality
election. A suitable partition of the region is called a districting plan, and the act of revising
it is called redistricting. States may have their own regulations governing the redistrict-
ing process, often including specific requirements for valid plans, and the procedures and
outcomes are the subject of considerable debate and legal scrutiny.
There are two main principles commonly applied to the shape (that is, the geometric
form) of districts: jurisdictions should be cut into pieces that are “contiguous” and that are
“compact.” Those evaluating a plan, whether during its construction and approval or during
subsequent challenges, need tools for assessment in the context of these two aims, among
others.
The first of these guidelines, contiguity, refers to topological connectedness: a district
should not be made up of multiple connected components. This is a widespread and un-
controversial requirement of districting plans.∗ In contrast with that clarity, compactness
gestures at the reasonableness of district shapes, and is rarely defined precisely, if at all.
Even on such unsteady footing, the notion is critical to any discussion of redistricting (and,
in particular, to any discussion of abusive districting practices broadly known as gerry-
mandering) because compactness appears as an explicit requirement in many states and is
nationally recognized as a traditional districting principle.† To date, more than thirty possi-
ble definitions of compactness as a shape quality metric have been proposed in the political
science literature (see [1, 5, 12] and references).
The purpose of this paper is to call attention to a shared feature in nearly all of the existing
definitions of compactness scores: they represent districts as regions enclosed by contours on
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. Primary: 91D20; Secondary: 05C90, 52C99, 90C35.
∗Note that while contiguity is largely unambiguous, there are numerous examples of it being achieved
by connective tissue along a highway or through water. For example, Illinois’s 4th Congressional District
uses a stretch of Interstate 294 to connect its northern and southern components, producing a shape often
described as “earmuffs.”
†See http://redistricting.lls.edu/where-state.php#compactness (accessed August 15, 2018),
which describes compactness requirements of some kind in 37 of the 50 states.
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2 DUCHIN AND TENNER
a map, then base their numerical scores on lengths and areas from the map. This makes all
of the classical definitions of compactness susceptible to a common set of flaws, undermining
the extent to which the definitions can be made precise and meaningful. In contrast, the
kind of discretization we propose here will make fundamental use of the population network
that is at the heart of the redistricting problem. We call for research towards creating a new
generation of discrete scores and we set some benchmarks and goals in that direction.
Acknowledgements. This work began during the Geometry of Redistricting Workshop
held at Tufts University in August 2017. We are grateful to the sponsors, speakers, and par-
ticipants. MD is supported by NSF DMS-1255442. BT is partially supported by a Simons
Foundation Collaboration Grant for Mathematicians and a DePaul University Faculty Sum-
mer Research Grant. Special thanks to Assaf Bar-Natan, Richard Barnes, Seth Drew, Lee
Hachadoorian, Adriana Rogers, and Alejandro Velez-Arce for computing and data support.
2. Compactness and electoral geography
2.1. Introducing compactness. The political relevance of requiring districts to be reason-
ably shaped—and not unnecessarily elongated or twisting—can be defended in several ways.
Geometric eccentricity can signal a districting plan that has been engineered to produce an
extreme outcome, often by exploiting demographics and geography in order to maximize
representation for one group at the expense of another. A mapmaker can tilt outcomes by
packing the out-group into a small number of districts, with wastefully high vote share in
those districts, and cracking their leftover population by dispersing it, thus diluting those
voters’ influence. Either strategy can induce distended district shapes in order to achieve
its purpose. A second, related argument for shape guidelines is that any limitation placed
on districters is a healthy check on their power. But third, and maybe most fundamental, is
that being more compact should mean that districts represent chunks of territory that have
a meaningful cohesion and can be traveled efficiently. A historical overview and taxonomy
of compactness definitions can be found in [5].
Many compactness definitions, when they are attempted, rely on the measurement of area
and perimeter. For instance, as discussed below, one of the most prevalent definitions of
compactness takes the ratio of area to perimeter-squared. In this paper, we argue that stan-
dard measures of area and perimeter are problematic in their application to redistricting.
To the extent that districting plans are defined by how they partition the people in a juris-
diction, they rely on fundamentally discrete data. This reality is obscured in the focus on
map contours.
2.2. Districts and their building blocks. Political jurisdictions—even states themselves—
have legal definitions. The usable formats for communicating those definitions are usually
based on discrete approximations to the legal definitions. In the age of GIS (geographic
information systems), the most common data format for geographic units is called a shape-
file. These files store a definition of each unit as a polygon, possibly with many thousands
of vertices. For instance, the finest units of census geography are called blocks, which nest
into larger units called block groups, which in turn nest into tracts. For each category, the
geographic units in that category partition the state that they belong to, meaning that the
entire territory of the state (land and water) is covered by the census units at that given
scale, and furthermore that those units are disjoint from each other, except along their bor-
ders. Blocks also nest into voting tabulation districts (VTDs), which can be thought of as
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the Census Bureau’s recommended precincts, and are the closest match in census geography
for the level at which election results are reported.
Congressional districts form another partition of the state.∗ They are essentially always
made out of whole census blocks, whereas district lines frequently cut across block groups,
tracts, and VTDs.† Within a given state, every district must have very nearly the same
population, counted by adding the census population of each district’s blocks.‡
The Census Bureau releases an updated vintage of its most precise shapefiles—so-called
TIGER/Line Shapefiles [20]—every year, with a special release for congressional districts
once they have stabilized after each decennial census. It also releases Cartographic Boundary
Shapefiles of districts [21], which are intended for the purpose of map-drawing rather than
definition. These Cartographic maps are prepared for every Congress, at three levels of
resolution, discussed further below.
3. Polsby-Popper and other contour-based scores
“Compactness,” unlike contiguity, is a continuous concept that concerns the
geographical shapes of districts. There is no bright line test that determines
whether a district is or is not compact, but districts may be considered more
or less compact. While numerous quantitative measures of compactness have
been proposed for this purpose, the two measures that are now referenced the
most are a dispersion measure known as the Reock measure and a perimeter
measure known as the Polsby-Po[p]per measure.
–Dick Engstrom, Martinez v Bush, expert report
We begin by introducing the most commonly cited compactness metric in litigation, the
Polsby-Popper score, and we discuss its variants and a few alternatives in the legal literature.
The motivating idea for Polsby-Popper and its cousins is that a “compact” region should
have large area relative to its perimeter. This is an isoperimetric score, because it creates a
ranking among regions with a given (“iso” = same) perimeter.
Figure 1. Four regions, each with the same perimeter, are shown from left
to right in order of increasing area. The region with largest possible area
relative to the fixed perimeter—the circle—is deemed the most “compact” by
Polsby-Popper scoring.
∗There are a few subtleties in the definition of congressional districts that may make them not quite
a well-defined partition; for instance, large bodies of water such as the Great Lakes may or may not be
included in any district in a state.
†Only Kentucky has districts that split census blocks, according to the Census Bureau (https://www.
census.gov/rdo/pdf/CD113_BlockSplits.pdf, accessed August 15, 2018).
‡The issue of how to count population—and which population gets counted—is discussed further on
page 10.
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3.1. Perimeter versus Area. It has been known (or guessed) since antiquity that
circles have the most area among all shapes with a given perimeter.
In other words, all shapes satisfy 0 ≤ 4piA
P 2
≤ 1, where A stands for area and P stands for
perimeter. Depending on the scope of the statement (i.e., on the generality of what counts
as a “shape”), this can be credited to Jakob Steiner in the 1830s, although his methods are
not fully general from the point of view of today’s geometric analysis. Here is a modern
statement of the phenomenon.
Theorem 1 (Isoperimetric Theorem). Let Ω be a bounded open subset of R2 whose boundary
∂Ω is a rectifiable curve. Then the Lebesgue measure m and the length ` are related by the
inequality
4pi ·m(Ω) ≤ `(∂Ω)2,
with equality if and only if Ω is a disk and ∂Ω is a circle.
In this generality, Theorem 1 is easily proved using the Brunn-Minkowski inequality [16].
Despite the pedigree of this theorem, it was a 1991 article by law scholars Polsby and Popper
that led to their names being attached to the associated formula in political science [13].
Definition 2. The Polsby-Popper score of a region Ω is
PP(Ω) := 4pi · area(Ω)
perim(Ω)2
.
The reason that experts frequently apply this score to voting districts is the idea referenced
above, that tentacled or otherwise eccentric districts are red flags for possible gerrymander-
ing. Shapes with skinny necks or long spurs will have much less area than could have been
enclosed by the same boundary length around a plumper shape.
Higher Polsby-Popper scores are therefore deemed preferable to lower ones. By Theorem 1,
the score satisfies 0 ≤ PP(Ω) ≤ 1 for all shapes, with PP(Ω) = 1 realized only when Ω is a
circle. The squaring of the perimeter in the denominator of the Polsby-Popper score makes
the units of measurement cancel out, so that the score is (theoretically) scale-invariant. In
other words, PP(kΩ) = PP(Ω), meaning that if one were to enlarge an entire region by
a factor of k, its Polsby-Popper score would not register the change. Thus this metric is
designed to measure something about the shape, and not the size, of a district.
Polsby-Popper scores are cited in dozens of court cases on redistricting.∗
Remark 3. One easily verifies that PP(Ω) is also given by the ratio of the area of Ω to the
area of the circle having circumference equal to the perimeter of Ω.
A cosmetic variant of the Polsby-Popper score, which in fact predates Polsby-Popper in
the literature, is the Schwartzberg score. This was originally defined as the ratio of the
perimeter of a district to the perimeter (circumference) of the circle having the same area, so
∗See Louisiana House of Representatives v Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003); Martinez v Bush, 234
F. Supp. 2d 1275 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Perez v Perry, 835 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Vesilind
v Virginia State Board of Elections, 15 F. Supp. 3d 657, 664 (E.D. Va. 2014); Page v Virginia State Board
of Elections, 15 F. Supp. 3d 657 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015); Sanders v Dooly County, 245 F. 3d 1289 (11th
Cir. 2001); Session v Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. Jan 6, 2004); Garza v. County of Los Angeles,
Cal., 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Harris v McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 611 (M.D.N.C. 2016);
Johnson v Miller, 922 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Cromartie v Hunt, 526 U.S. 541 (1999); Moon v
Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1997); and many more.
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that lower Schwartzberg scores are deemed preferable to higher ones [15]. This is expressed
by
Schw(Ω) :=
perim(Ω)√
4pi · area(Ω) = PP(Ω)
−1/2.
Since one score is simply the other score raised to a power, it is clear that, although specific
numerical values will differ, Schwartzberg and Polsby-Popper assessments must rank districts
from best to worst in precisely the same way.∗ Because Joseph Schwartzberg worried that
there was no way (with 1966 technology) to accurately measure perimeters of districts, he
also proposed a notion of gross perimeter, which comes from a partial discretization [15]. As
a result, software like Maptitude for Redistricting uses a different definition of perimeter in
the computation of a Schwartzberg score than in the computation of a Polsby-Popper score,
which of course can break the scores’ monotonic relationship. See [6] for an example of how
the resulting scores can differ.
The language used to formulate compactness scores is often imprecise in court documents.
This means that what sound like different combinations of area and perimeter frequently
point back to these two scores. For instance, there are numerous references to “perimeter-to-
area” and “area-to-perimeter” scores in expert reports. These names suggest computations
of P/A or A/P , but where we have been able to find definitions, the definitions refer again
to Polsby-Popper or its reciprocal.†
3.2. The landscape of compactness metrics. Despite the fact that experts frequently
cite Polsby-Popper scores, there is no consensus on how these scores should be used when de-
termining the validity of a districting plan. To make matters more confusing, legal contexts
often call for the reporting of more than one type of compactness score. Consider the recent
litigation-driven congressional redistricting in Pennsylvania. In the court orders of January
22 and 26, 2018, it is required that “[A]ny redistricting plan the parties or intervenors choose
to submit to the Court for its consideration shall include . . . [a] report detailing the com-
pactness of the districts according to each of the following measures: Reock; Schwartzberg;
Polsby-Popper; Population Polygon; and Minimum Convex Polygon.”‡
• Reock: the area of a district divided by the area of its smallest circumscribing circle
[14];
• Population Polygon: the population of a district divided by the population con-
tained in its convex hull;§ and
∗This is because for positive values of x and y, we have x > y ⇐⇒ x−1/2 < y−1/2. Therefore a higher
(and thus better) PP score corresponds to a lower (and thus better) Schw score.
†A few selections from expert reports: (1) “Perimeter-to-Area (PTA) measure compares the relative
length of the perimeter of a district to its area. It is represented as the ratio of the area of a circle with the
same perimeter as the district to the area of the district.” R. Keith Gaddie, Sessions v Texas report; (2)
“Perimeter to Area – Known as the Polsby-Popper test, this measure compares the area of the district with
the area of a circle of the same perimeter, using the formula 4piArea/Perimeter2.” Todd Giberson, Perez v
Perry report; (3) “The Polsby-Popper measure, a perimeter-to-area comparison, calculates the ratio of the
district area to the area of a circle with the same perimeter.” M. V. (Trey) Hood III, Vesilind v Virginia
State Board of Elections report.
‡Turzai v League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, 17A909 (2018).
§A convex body is a region that contains the entire line segment between any two of its points. The
convex hull of a region is the smallest convex body containing the region. This is sometimes picturesquely
referred to as the “rubber-band enclosure.”
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• Minimum Convex Polygon (also known as the Convex Hull score): the area of a
district divided by the area of its convex hull.
The court orders do not specify whether any of these assessments might be more important
than the others, nor how two plans are to be compared.
A final notable variant to these scores is to simply report the total perimeter involved in a
districting plan. For example, the state constitutions of Iowa and Colorado and at least one
expert report∗ compare the total area of the jurisdiction (which is constant across alterna-
tive/contending districting plans for that jurisdiction) to the sum of all district perimeters.
Each of these metrics, including Polsby-Popper and Schwartzberg, requires drawing a dis-
trict as a domain on a map of the state. This domain is bounded by a contour, and then
classical (Euclidean) geometry is invoked to make some sort of computation. Population
Polygon stands out by taking population location into account, but it still relies on the con-
tour in a fundamental way. Modern geometry, however, is not limited to the planar domains
of Euclid. Since the twentieth century, geometry has flourished in a discrete, combinatorial
setting. The objects in this framework (such as graphs, groups, and complexes) are made
up of individual elements that one can enumerate, rather than the smoothly varying quanti-
ties of classical geometry. Electoral districts, being made up of census units, therefore lend
themselves well to discrete techniques, as we will argue below.
4. Problems with contour-based scores
4.1. Four issues. As we have seen, the most-cited compactness scores are all contour-based.
We now articulate problems with the scores that are inextricably tied to the use of Euclidean
geometry on map contours. We offer illustrations for each issue in the next section, using
actual congressional districts.
Issue A: Coastline effects. Districts with boundaries produced by natu-
ral physical features, such as coastlines, are heavily penalized by compactness
scores based on the perimeters of contours.
Issue B: Resolution instability. Choice of map resolution can have a
dramatic impact on contour-based compactness scores, both individually and
in comparison to each other, and there is no finest canonical resolution at
which data can be gathered.
Issue C: Coordinate dependence. Choices of map projection and coor-
dinate system can impose drastic changes on the contour-based compactness
scores of districts, both individually and in comparison to each other.
Issue D: Empty space effects. Although unpopulated regions have no im-
pact whatsoever on electoral outcomes, contour-based compactness scores are
highly sensitive to their assignment to districts.
∗Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund v Gantt, 796 F. Supp. 677 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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4.2. Discussion and examples. In the following discussion, individual congressional dis-
tricts and district data refer to the vintage from the 113th Congress (2013), unless specified
otherwise.
Issue A: Coastline effects. Districts with boundaries produced by natural physical features,
such as coastlines, are heavily penalized by compactness scores based on the perimeters of
contours.
Contour-based scores with a perimeter component do not register when a portion of a
district’s border may be explained by a pertinent geographical feature like a coastline or
an irregular state boundary. In such a situation, the districting plan might incur a steep
penalty for having this erratic perimeter, even though that district border had not been
chosen through any questionable or manipulative process. For example, Alabama’s 1st Con-
gressional District is partly bounded by the Gulf of Mexico to the south, and the Tombigbee
and Alabama Rivers to the north. As depicted in Figure 2, this creates sections of eccentric
natural boundary. Some shapefiles mitigate the effects from Gulf boundary by extending
into the water, but this is problematic in other ways—and of course nothing similar can
be done for the river boundary. Accordingly, AL-1 has a fairly low Polsby-Popper score
(approximately .162, ranking 318th out of 435) in the TIGER/Line Shapefiles (shown at
left in the figure), but scores significantly worse (.111, ranking 367th) in the Cartographic
maps (shown at right).∗ There is no standard on whether to include water when reporting
compactness scores.†
Figure 2. Alabama’s 1st district has boundary partly defined by the Gulf
of Mexico and the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers. The TIGER/Line (left)
and Cartographic 500K (right) maps are shown here, illustrating that the
Polsby-Popper quantification of compactness leaves the modeler caught in an
unpleasant choice between a map subject to coastline effects (Issue A) or to
empty space effects (Issue D).
Consideration of the coastline issue leads naturally to a related worry about stability
of scores under changes in resolution. A coastline border is irregular and, in a sense, un-
measurable. This is the well-known “coastline paradox” sometimes attributed to Benoit
Mandelbrot: the length of the coast of Great Britain depends on the size of one’s ruler [11].
∗The reader can find code, data, and documentation for area and perimeter statistics at [18].
†For instance, some districting plans filed with the court in Pennsylvania’s 2018 redistricting included
portions of Lake Erie in the northwest of the state, and others did not.
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In this way, the quantities area(Ω) and perim(Ω) depend on the scale of precision used when
mapping the region, and can change significantly at different resolutions. In fact, perim is
notably more sensitive than area to changes in resolution: admitting finer wiggles in the
boundary may only slightly affect a region’s area, while causing a substantial increase in the
region’s perimeter. Indeed it is clear from consideration of curves within a unit square that
arbitrarily long perimeter can exist within a fixed finite area.
Issue B: Resolution instability. Choice of map resolution can have a dramatic impact
on contour-based compactness scores, both individually and in comparison to each other, and
there is no finest canonical resolution at which data can be gathered.
Census Bureau Cartographic Boundary files are available in three scales:
500K (1:500,000), 5M (1:5,000,000), 20M (1:20,000,000).
One would expect some variation in the perimeters and areas of districts because the 20M files
are greatly simplified. Indeed, the Census Bureau itself flags this issue, warning that “These
boundary files are specifically designed for small scale thematic mapping . . . These files
should not be used for . . . geographic analysis including area or perimeter calculation” [21].
Nonetheless, we use those maps here as an extreme illustration of an issue that will be present
whenever map resolution can vary: not only are area and perimeter themselves altered, but
those changes are compounded by the way Polsby-Popper is calculated. Perimeter is typically
more sensitive to resolution change, and because it is squared, the Polsby-Popper score may
drop precipitously at higher resolutions.
For example, California’s 53rd Congressional District sees an 81% jump in perimeter
when going from the 20M scale to the 500K scale. In the same transition, the district’s area
increases by less than 9%, notable both because this change is nonzero and because it is
so different from the perimeter change. This has an enormous effect on its relative ranking
among the 435 congressional districts: from ranking 61st at the coarsest zoom, it drops to
191st and then to 292nd at the finest zoom. That means that the district’s assessed shape
quality goes from being in the best third, to the middle third, to the worst third, inviting
completely different qualitative assessments. On average, when comparing data between
the 20M scale and the 500K scale, congressional district perimeters increase by about 23%,
while district areas increase by 0.2%. Clearly both statistics are sensitive to resolution, and
perimeter is markedly more so.
Pursuing this issue a step further, one might propose that the finest possible resolution
will provide the best accuracy, and so the “shortest ruler,” to borrow terminology from the
coastline paradox, should be used. However, map scale can vary continuously, achieving
arbitrarily high or low resolutions. Barnes and Solomon explore this phenomenon fully in
a 2018 preprint [2], where they do not rely on census cartographic maps but vary map
resolution along a spectrum.
Even in practical terms, if we tried to treat census-provided geography as canonical, issues
of measurement precision do not disappear. Each year’s TIGER/Line file release tends to
offer a slightly modified version of state boundaries from those released the year before,
sometimes with adjustments on the order of inches from one year to the next, reflecting
what the Bureau regards as improved accuracy. Redistricting analysts would need to use
maps not only from the same source, but also from precisely the same vintage, in order to
expect compatible results.
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Issue C: Coordinate dependence. Choices of map projection and coordinate system can
impose drastic changes on the contour-based compactness scores of districts, both individually
and in comparison to each other.
The Earth’s surface is roughly spherical, but most maps are planar renderings. That is,
most maps are flat. It is well known that there are multiple competing methods for projecting
regions from a sphere to a plane, and that it is impossible to choose a map projection which
faithfully preserves both shape and area of regions on the sphere. (This is because any
smooth map that preserves area and angles must be a local isometry, and so must preserve
total curvature.)
Figure 3. Three map projections. The first preserves angle measurements
from the sphere; the last preserves area; and the middle map is an attempted
compromise between the two, sacrificing some accuracy in each [10, 17].
The Reock score, which is not as badly plagued by the first two issues as Polsby-Popper,
emerges as extremely problematic in its coordinate dependence. Hachadoorian et al. [8] show
that Reock scores can change dramatically just by choosing a different way to project the
earth onto a flat plane. For instance, out of 18 districts that they selected for compari-
son, 8 had changes of 24% or more in their Reock scores among three projections (locally
parametrized Albers equal-area; World Mercator; and plate carre´e lat-long). Even worse, the
changes were in unpredictable directions, with some scores increasing and some decreasing
over a given shift in map projection.
Even the Population Polygon score, which sounds promising because it is population-
based, suffers from coordinate dependence. The geometric rendering of the district does not
impact the population of the district, of course, but it heavily affects the form of the convex
hull, and therefore the population enclosed by it.
Finally, we flag a fundamental problem with the use of area in compactness scores. Above,
we discussed several worries about whether area of districts is well-defined, but even beyond
that, area itself is of no particular relevance in redistricting.
Issue D: Empty space effects. Although unpopulated regions have no impact whatso-
ever on electoral outcomes, contour-based compactness scores are highly sensitive to their
assignment to districts.
Districts are to be equalized by population, not by acreage, and districts are intended to
specify voter assignments. Consider an unpopulated geographical region—an uninhabitable
mountain, say—with different districts to its north and south. The assignment of all or
part or none of this unpopulated region to the northern district has no influence on voting,
and should not have a great impact on the districts’ quality. However, the choice of how to
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allocate this unpopulated region between the two districts can have a marked influence on
their perimeters and areas.
One major source of unpopulated surface area is water. To see the impact that this can
have on shapes, consider that by census measurements, fifteen states are at least 10% water
by area, with Michigan topping the list at 41.5%. Overall, water makes up 7% of the United
States census geography [22]. More broadly, in the 2010 census, nearly 45% of census blocks
had zero reported population. Indeed, under every contour-based score, compactness can be
wildly skewed by assignments of unpopulated surface area to districts.
Figure 4. Unpopulated census blocks, excluding the Great Lakes, are de-
picted in dark green in these maps by Nik Freeman [7].
5. Discrete geometry
5.1. Discreteness. The mathematical term discrete refers to a set whose elements are dis-
tinguishably isolated from each other.∗ Any set with only finitely many elements is necessarily
discrete.
In jurisprudence dating to 1964 and clarified as recently as 2016, the Supreme Court
has affirmed that districts are to be created in a way that nearly equalizes their census
population.† The case law that has built up around this has led to the practice of “zeroing
out” census population in congressional districts. That is, most states equalize population to
within ten people across districts, and many get the deviation down to a single person. But
the census does not report the locations of individual people: its finest level of detail is the
census block. The average number of people per block in the 2010 Census is about 28. As
discussed above, blocks nest inside of other census geographies (block groups, tracts, VTDs,
counties) making it possible to calculate the population of these units. For these reasons,
census blocks, and the larger elements they define, are the natural units for redistricting.
∗The technical definition is as follows: given a topological space (X, T ), a subset S ⊆ X is discrete if
for each element x ∈ X, there exists a neighborhood Ux containing x and no other element of S; that is,
Ux ∩ S = {x}. By contrast, consider a disk in the plane: there is no way to isolate a single point from all
other points, no matter how closely one zooms in.
†Reynolds v Sims (1964) gave the general dictum “One Person, One Vote,” which by common practice
was taken to require the near-equalization of census population across districts. In Evenwel v Abbott (2016),
the court technically affirmed that census population may be used for this purpose, leaving the door open
for the use of other measurements such as voting-eligible population. However, the decision’s deference to
“history, precedent, and practice” has left intact the presumption that census-based population will continue
to be the standard.
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For redistricting purposes, it is also important to know which geographic units are adjacent
to which other ones, in order to uphold contiguity. The mathematical data type for recording
finitely many elements and the adjacencies among them is called a graph or network.
Figure 5. The 2372 VTDs in Virginia are shown as the vertices of a graph,
with edges indicating geographic adjacencies. One could also make the corre-
sponding graph of the 285,762 census blocks, and it would look substantially
more complicated.
We will discuss redistricting-specific ideas in Section 6, but we first develop terminology
and notation for graphs.
5.2. Graph basics. A graph is defined by a set of vertices, sometimes called nodes, and a
set of edges that record adjacencies between vertices. Here we will introduce only as much
terminology as is needed for this discussion, and refer the reader to numerous graph theory
texts (for example, [4]) for more information. Throughout this work, all graphs will be
assumed to be simple and undirected.
A graph G = (V,E) consists of a vertex set V and an edge set E, where each edge is an
unordered pair of distinct vertices, and those vertices are said to be adjacent to each other.
We may use the notation e = uv = vu to refer to an edge e joining vertices u and v, and we
say that u and v are incident to e. A graph may be endowed with a (vertex) weight function,
w : V → R≥0, assigning nonnegative values to the vertices.
An induced subgraph of G consists of a subset of the vertices, together with all edges of G
that are present among those vertices; that is, vertices in the subgraph are considered to be
adjacent if and only if they were adjacent in the original graph G. The induced subgraph in
G formed by the vertices Ω ⊆ V is denoted G[Ω]. The order of a graph is the number of its
vertices. Thus the order of G is |V | and the order of the induced subgraph G[Ω] is |Ω|. The
complement of a subset Ω ⊆ V is the set Ωc := {v : v ∈ V and v 6∈ Ω}. Thus any Ω and its
complement form a partition of the vertex set V . The set of edges uv for which u ∈ Ω and
v ∈ Ωc is a cut-set, or sometimes a cut, of G. Observe that this cut-set is entirely defined by
the partition formed by Ω and its complement, and hence entirely defined by Ω.
All of the above terms are standard graph theoretic concepts. We now set out a few
specialized definitions that will be helpful below.
Definition 4. Given a graph G = (V,E) and a subset Ω ⊆ V , the internal boundary ∂0Ω
of the induced subgraph G[Ω] is the set of vertices in Ω that have neighbors outside of Ω:
∂0Ω := {u ∈ Ω : uv ∈ E for some v /∈ Ω}.
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Equivalently, the internal boundary ∂0Ω is the set of vertices in Ω that are incident to
edges in the cut-set of G defined by Ω.
Definition 5. A graph with boundary is a graph G = (V,E) together with a designated
subset of vertices ∂G ⊆ V that are designated as boundary vertices. The total boundary of
an induced subgraph G[Ω] is ∂Ω := ∂0Ω ∪ (Ω ∩ ∂G), which is the interior boundary together
with any vertices of Ω that belong to the boundary of the ambient graph G.
Example 6. Let G = (V,E) be the graph depicted in Figure 6, and define its boundary to be
∂G := {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5}. Consider the subset of vertices Ω := {v1, v2, v3, v4, v7, v9, v10} ⊂ V .
In Figure 6, the boundary ∂G is shaded and the induced subgraph G[Ω] is colored red. The
internal boundary of G[Ω] is
∂0Ω = {v1, v2, v4, v7, v10},
because each of those vertices is adjacent to at least one element of Ωc = {v5, v6, v8}, meaning
that it is incident to an edge in the cut-set. The total boundary of G[Ω] is
∂Ω = {v1, v2, v4, v7, v10} ∪ (Ω ∩ {v1, v2, v3, v4, v5})
= {v1, v2, v3, v4, v7, v10}.
Endow G with vertex weights as displayed in the table.
v v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7 v8 v9 v10
w(v) 2 7 8 1 5 6 0 2 10 2
One easily calculates that 6/7 of the vertices of Ω are in its total boundary, while the boundary
contains only 2/3 of the vertex weight:∑
v∈∂Ω
w(v)∑
v∈Ω
w(v)
=
2 + 7 + 8 + 1 + 0 + 2
2 + 7 + 8 + 1 + 0 + 10 + 2
=
20
30
=
2
3
.
v1v2
v3
v4
v5
v6 v7
v8
v9
v10
Figure 6. The graph G from Example 6. The boundary vertices of the graph,
∂G, are shaded grey, the vertices in Ω are circled, and the induced subgraph
G[Ω] is colored red.
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5.3. Motivation from group theory and topology. In geometric group theory and
algebraic topology, it is a standard technique to create combinatorial model spaces out of
vertices, faces, and higher-dimensional cells in order to help understand the geometry of
groups and manifolds. One can then compare the length (L) of a loop in the edges of the
model space to the number (N) of cells in a filling (the faces enclosed by the loop). In
the context of our previous discussion, these values L and N present abstract analogs of
perimeter and area, respectively. Figure 7 shows four examples.
Figure 7. It is instructive to consider edge loops in the graphs depicted here
and to compare their length, L, to the number of cells they can enclose, N . Any
loop in the square grid satisfies the inequality N ≤ 1
16
L2, while the triangular
grid has N ≤ 1
6
L2. The hyperbolic triangulation at bottom left has N ≤ L for
any loop, no matter how large, while the Heisenberg graph, of which a portion
is shown at bottom right, has no inequality better than N ≤ L3.
Filling inequalities of the kind discussed in the caption of Figure 7, called Dehn functions in
the setting of groups, are discrete versions of the isoperimetric ratio. These have been studied
since the pioneering work of Dehn in the early twentieth century. For an introductory-level
treatment, see [3, Ch. 8 and 9].
The inequalities depicted in Figure 7 can easily be rewritten to relate the order of an
induced subgraph to the order of its boundary. The resulting bounds may differ in their
coefficients, but will have the same exponents.∗ That is, for any subgraph Ω whose boundary
∗The number of edges in a simple loop is equal to the number of its vertices. Furthermore, if the complex
has bounded geometry (meaning that there is some bound k so that every vertex has degree at most k and
every face has at most k sides), then the number of faces in a filling, the number of edges, and the number
of vertices are all mutually bounded.
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∂Ω lies on a loop, the inequalities relating N and L can be converted to inequalities relating
|Ω| and |∂Ω| that are all of the form
|Ω| ≤ c · |∂Ω|k.
This is just as in the classical Isoperimetric Theorem, in which k = 2 and c = 1/(4pi). This
motivates our move below to view the discrete area of a district in terms of the vertices of
its defining graph, and the discrete perimeter in terms of boundary vertices.
6. Discretizing compactness
We will lay out some direction below for how to import isoperimetric ideas from discrete
geometry into the study of electoral geography. In doing so, we will flag the decision junctures
at which the modeler—who may be working as part of the creation and approval process
for new districts, or may be working to assess a districting plan after the fact—is making
choices that might impact the qualitative features of the scores.
6.1. Creating the census data graph. We now have notation and terminology needed to
discuss the representation of a state (or other jurisdiction) as a vertex-weighted graph. We
record one vertex for each unit of census geography (such as blocks, block groups, tracts,
VTDs, or counties). An edge is added between two vertices when the corresponding units
share part of their boundary, and the modeler can choose whether to use so-called rook
adjacency or queen adjacency, where the names are drawn from the movement of the corre-
sponding chess pieces. This is a standard construction called the dual graph of a partition
of the plane, and Figure 8 gives examples.
dual graph
(rook)
dual graph
(queen)
Figure 8. On the left is a partition of a region into five units. The middle
and righthand figures represent dual graphs of this partition, where the middle
figure has used rook adjacency and the righthand figure uses queen adjacency.
The weight of the vertices in the dual graph G is given by the census population of the
corresponding unit. The boundary ∂G of the graph is the subset of vertices whose units
are on the outer boundary of the state. Here, the modeler might choose to separately mark
vertices according to whether they border water or other significant topographical features,
in order to engineer definitions that most effectively counteract coastline-type effects. (In
that case, one might modify the definition of ∂Ω accordingly.)
The goal of this paper is to give new tools for quantitative assessment of the compactness
of districts, and so we will consider the induced subgraph that corresponds to a district.
As we have seen, census block inclusion in districts is typically all or nothing, but districts
frequently split the larger census units. Therefore, if bigger units are being used, then an
allocation system is needed in order to decide which units belong to which districts. For
example, the modeler might assign each unit to the district in which the largest part of its
land area lies, or the largest portion of its population. Alternatively, there could be an area
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threshold for membership, such as including a vertex in the induced subgraph for a district
if, say, 10% or 50% of its area lies in the district; taking this logic a step further, a vertex for
a split unit could be included with fractional weight. We note that for any new definition of
compactness, the impact of making different choices at this stage will have to be studied.
6.2. Ideas and questions for discrete compactness. We now discuss ideas for compact-
ness based on dual graphs built from census units. The aim of our work here is to establish
a framework for redesigning compactness scores in a discrete setting, to which the data is
better suited and in which the issues outlined above have been defused. We will consider
these issues in turn, posing challenges for any proposed definitions of discrete compactness
scores that we hope will drive future research.
First, note that coordinate data is not recorded in any of the variants of the census data
graph discussed above. Thus any compactness score based on this graph—in contrast with
all contour-based scores—will automatically be independent of map projection or choice of
coordinates. This completely addresses Issue C above. The remaining three issues require
more care.
The principle of discrete compactness scores is to use the combinatorial geometry of these
graphs. Taking a cue from the filling inequalities in §5.3, we have a clear starting point
suggested by the mathematical developments of the last several decades. We start by taking
the discrete area to be the order (that is, the number of vertices) of the district subgraph and
the discrete perimeter to be the order of its boundary, possibly choosing to weight both of
these calculations by population, as demonstrated in Example 6. This immediately suggests
two discrete analogs of the Polsby-Popper score of a district. We can let the compactness
be measured by
(1) discrete area divided by the square of discrete perimeter; or
(2) the same calculation, but weighted by population.
These scores are, respectively,
(1)
|Ω|
|∂Ω|2
and
(2)
∑
v∈Ω
w(v)( ∑
v∈∂Ω
w(v)
)2 .
To defend the decision to square the perimeter, consider the lattice examples in Figure 9.
The square-shaped subgraph Ωn in the square lattice G and the hexagon-shaped subgraph
Ω′n in the triangular lattice G
′ have isoperimetric ratios
|Ωn|
|∂Ωn|2 =
n2
16(n− 1)2 and
|Ω′n|
|∂Ω′n|2
=
3n2 − 3n+ 1
36(n− 1)2 ,
respectively. These tend to positive, finite limits as n gets large (1/16 for the square case
and 1/12 for the hexagon), whereas if any other power of perimeter had been used, the limits
would be zero or infinity. We interpret this to say that if a grid has underlying geometry
that is roughly Euclidean, then the squaring of perimeter makes these measurements stable
under refinement of the grid. (Compare this to the other filling exponents found in the
non-Euclidean examples from Figure 7.)
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Figure 9. Square and triangular lattices with square and hexagonal “dis-
tricts” Ω7 and Ω
′
4, respectively.
We note that there is no need for a coefficient in the discrete calculation to play the role of
4pi from the classical formula. This is because 4pi was chosen in order to scale the continuous
value PP to lie in the unit interval, whereas these discrete variants can take arbitrarily large
or small values.∗ We consider this to be a feature, not a bug: it reminds the responsible
modeler to only compare a compactness score to others that have been collected at the same
resolution, which is a good practice, whether scores are contour-based or discrete.
We now turn our attention to Issues A, B, and D from Section 4. At first glance, discretiza-
tion seems also to dispatch coastline effects (Issue A), since the census geography along the
coast will absorb any wiggling perimeter into a fixed (and not unduly large) number of units.
But this is an empirical question.
Benchmark 1. Does the proposed definition of discrete compactness mitigate coastline is-
sues? To measure this, one should examine a state with ocean, lake, or river coast and
determine whether the assessment tends to systematically score the coastal districts worse
than others, controlling for features such as population density. Does the proposed definition
introduce new coastline-like effects? One should study the correlates of good or bad perfor-
mance in any new proposed score to be sure that no irrelevant features are being unduly
penalized.
One possible strategy to inoculate discrete isoperimetry scores from many coastline-type
effects could be to disregard exterior boundary in the calculation of district perimeter, say by
computing |Ω|/|∂0Ω|2 or its population-weighted counterpart. More generally, the definition
of a district’s internal boundary might be profitably revised in some more delicate way, such
as by declaring a vertex u to belong to the boundary if it is incident to an edge uv in the
cut-set (that is, uv is an edge and v ∈ Ωc) such that
F (u, v) = true,
where F is a particular boolean function on the vertices u and v. For example, one could
choose to only include vertices v that represent a census unit with nonzero population (and
so F would be “w(v) > 0”), or a census unit with population above a certain threshold
(making F be “w(v) > k” for some k).
∗To see this, note that with a uniform weighting function, a path of length n would have isoperimetric
ratio approaching zero; on the other hand, we can produce scores tending to infinity if we begin with a fixed
district Ω and successively subdivide interior cells while leaving the boundary fixed.
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Next, some degree of insulation from resolution instability (Issue B) is guaranteed for
discrete compactness scores. This is because the only parameter that plays the role of map
resolution is the choice of geographic units, and that varies among only finitely many choices
over a census cycle, rather than varying arbitrarily as in the contour-based setting. However,
we should be on the lookout for other kinds of instability, such as excessive sensitivity to the
choices made when assigning units to a district.
Benchmark 2. Does the proposed definition of discrete compactness either have a preferred
unit of census geography, or can it be shown to be stable under transition from blocks to block
groups to tracts? To study this stability, one could rank districts by their discrete compactness
scores and compare those ranked lists at different resolutions. The lists would surely not be
identical at each resolution, but a metric on the space of permutations (such as Kendall’s τ
metric [9]) can assess whether the rankings are close.
Blocks seem like a good choice of standard—a better choice than tracts or VTDs in this
regard—because blocks generally do not straddle multiple districts, leaving fewer choices to
make in defining and weighting district membership.
Finally, discrete compactness scores that do not use population weighting are still subject
to empty space effects (Issue D), but this can be cured entirely by use of population-weighted
scores, which do not “see” unpopulated areas. At first this seems like a powerful commen-
dation for population-weighted scores like in Expression (2) above. However, this raises the
concern that an abusively drawn district can make its gerrymander invisible by adding a
buffer of unpopulated units around its border, thereby dropping the weighted perimeter to
near zero. To deal with this tradeoff, ideas to refine the definition of boundary—such as by
use of the boolean function F described above—may be particularly relevant.
Benchmark 3. For the proposed definition of discrete compactness, what district features
are incentivized? Would adoption of the definition promote fairer districting practices, by
the lights of traditional districting principles and other civil rights goals? To study this,
one might for instance use algorithmic generation to create large numbers of alternative
districting plans for the same jurisdiction and look for common geographical or demographic
features of the districts that score high or low.∗
6.3. Future research. In the previous section we introduced some opening ideas for discrete
isoperimetry and toured through some of their features and the questions they raise. We feel
that these questions can only be addressed through a mix of theory and data analysis. It
will also be interesting to push beyond isoperimetry and work to construct discrete (graph-
based) analogs of convex hull and dispersion-based scores, among others. We hope that
future research will employ the data collected by the Voting Rights Data Institute and made
public at [18] to analyze novel discrete compactness scores—applied to data drawn from
historical and new districting plans—in order to better understand their properties and the
extent to which they avoid the critiques presented here, which are fundamentally applicable
to all contour-based scores.
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